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Previous research provides evidence for a dissociable embodied route to spatial
perspective-taking that is under strategic control. The present experiment investigated
further the influence of strategy on spatial perspective-taking by assessing whether
participants may also elect to employ a separable “disembodied” route loading on
inhibitory control mechanisms. Participants (N = 92) undertook both the “own body
transformation” (OBT) perspective-taking task, requiring speeded spatial judgments made
from the perspective of an observed figure, and a control task measuring ability to inhibit
spatially compatible responses in the absence of a figure. Perspective-taking performance
was found to be related to performance on the response inhibition control task, in that
participants who tended to take longer to adopt a new perspective also tended to show
a greater elevation in response times when inhibiting spatially compatible responses.
This relationship was restricted to those participants reporting that they adopted the
perspective of another by reversing left and right whenever confronted with a front-view
figure; it was absent in those participants who reported perspective-taking by mentally
transforming their spatial orientation to align with that of the figure. Combined with
previously published results, these findings complete a double dissociation between
embodied and disembodied routes to spatial perspective-taking, implying that spatial
perspective-taking is subject to modulation by strategy, and suggesting that embodied
routes to perspective-taking may place minimal demands on domain general executive
functions.
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INTRODUCTION
Spatial perspective-taking underlies successful social interac-
tions (Tversky and Hard, 2009), for instance when giving direc-
tions or demonstrating how to perform a task. Furthermore,
spatial perspective-taking itself may be an intrinsically social
process, when the novel perspective one adopts is that occu-
pied by another person, rather than a position external to
that occupied by any other body (Stocker, 2012). Although it
has been well established that qualitatively different underlying
processes subserve different kinds of perspective-taking (e.g.,
Michelon and Zacks, 2006; David et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2009),
the manner in which these various perspective-taking mecha-
nisms rely on “embodied” cognitions such as the mental simu-
lation of body movements has yet to be fully specified—despite
this being an active line of enquiry (e.g., Kessler and Rutherford,
2010; Kessler and Thomson, 2010). Investigation of embodied
perspective-taking may help to elucidate how the spatial and
social domains impinge upon perspective-taking. Outstanding
issues include identifying the types of perspective-taking that are
possible via a “disembodied” route that engages response inhi-
bition rather than motor simulation or social processes, as well
as the role played by endogenous control processes in selecting
between multiple perspective-taking routes. Consequently, the
aim of the current study was to examine how these two types
of executive processes influence perspective-taking, by assessing
whether the strategy that participants report using moderates the
relationship between perspective-taking ability in the “own body
transformation” (OBT) task (e.g., Zacks et al., 1999; Blanke et al.,
2005; Mohr et al., 2010) and ability to perform a control task
indexing disembodied response inhibition processes.
The prevailing view is that spatial perspective-taking via
imagined transformations of one’s own egocentric perspec-
tive is an embodied process (e.g., Kessler and Rutherford, 2010;
Kessler and Thomson, 2010), in the sense that it is performed via
mental simulation of the sensorimotor mechanisms involved in
actual self rotation (Lenggenhager et al., 2008). The finding that
the speed and accuracy of taking another’s viewpoint depends
upon the degree of angular disparity between one’s own and
a target’s frame of reference provides evidence for an analogue
transformational process sharing at least some of the proper-
ties of self motion (Zacks and Michelon, 2005). Support for the
involvement of deliberate motor simulation is provided by reports
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that postural congruence between participants and targets facil-
itates perspective-taking performance (Kessler and Rutherford,
2010; Kessler and Thomson, 2010). In addition, an individual’s
motor capability appears to modulate the extent that motor
simulation is engaged in perspective-taking. For instance, skill
at performing rotational movements has been found to facil-
itate perspective-taking during a mental body rotation task
(Steggemann et al., 2011), and attentional biases associated with
participants’ own handedness have been found to extend to left-
right judgments made from a schematic figure’s perspective in
the OBT task (Gardner and Potts, 2010). Furthermore, patients
with left spatial neglect have even been found to recover infor-
mation that is unavailable from an egocentric perspective when
space is imagined from an opposite perspective (Becchio et al.,
2013). Of particular relevance, the degree of amelioration of
the neglected side is greatest in an embodied condition when
a person is seen to be present in the novel perspective. These
findings provide converging evidence for embodied processes
contributing to perspective-taking.
Nonetheless, under certain circumstances disembodied pro-
cesses appear sufficient to account for perspective-taking.
For instance, determining which objects can be seen from
another person’s perspective appears to involve line-of-sight
computation without the need for transformations of one’s
own perspective (Michelon and Zacks, 2006). The determi-
nation of spatial relationships relative to a third party
perspective within the OBT task has also been accounted for
in terms of domain general response selection processes and
spatial compatibility, either alone (Gardner and Potts, 2011),
or in combination with imagined perspective transformations
(May and Wendt, 2012). In these cases, a conflict arises between
information coded relative to one’s own bodily position and
information coded for the adopted perspective (May, 2004;
Michelon and Zacks, 2006). Thus, the cognitive demands of
perspective-taking are at least in part due to the need to
inhibit prepotent responses relating to one’s own perspective (cf
Leslie et al., 2005). In support of this view, the ability to adopt
a third party perspective has been shown to be disrupted when
performed alongside a secondary task loading on response inhi-
bition processes (Qureshi et al., 2010). Thus, “disembodied” exec-
utive functions, including response inhibition, may contribute to
perspective-taking alongside, or in place of, a cognitively efficient
“embodied” route.
One possibility is that separable embodied and disembodied
perspective-taking processes (May and Wendt, 2012), may in fact
be distinct routes to perspective-taking controlled by higher level
strategy (Gronholm et al., 2012). Although many have proposed
that utilization of different strategies could explain variation
in perspective-taking performance (Michelon and Zacks, 2006;
Thakkar et al., 2009; Mohr et al., 2010; Thakkar and Park, 2010),
the role of strategy has rarely been considered explicitly (Amorim,
2003). Initial evidence has been reported indicating the presence
of a dissociable strategy associated with embodied perspective-
taking (Lenggenhager et al., 2008; Gronholm et al., 2012). For
instance, the disruption to mental transformations arising from
galvanic vestibular stimulation was found to be restricted to
participants reporting that they had employed transformations
of their own perspective, rather than an object based strategy
(Lenggenhager et al., 2008). Using the OBT task, Gronholm et al.
(2012) found a selective association between trait level empa-
thy and perspective-taking ability that was restricted to partic-
ipants using an embodied perspective transformation strategy,
as opposed to disembodied strategy of reversing left and right
whenever confronted with a front-view figure (Gronholm et al.,
2012). This finding is consistent with mental simulation play-
ing a common role for embodied spatial perspective-taking
as well as social processes such as empathy and Theory of
Mind (Ruby and Decety, 2004). However, to date, no equivalent
independent evidence appears to be available for disembodied
perspective-taking strategies.
The current study was designed to assess further the influence
of strategy on perspective-taking in the OBT-task, by examining
whether the strategy that participants report using moderates
the relationship between perspective-taking and response inhi-
bition abilities. Previous work using an individual differences
approach has found that perspective taking is associated with
response inhibition ability (Qureshi, 2008). Here, we examine
whether this association is strategy-specific. In the present study,
participants undertook both the OBT perspective-taking task,
requiring speeded spatial judgments made from the perspective
of an observed figure, and the “Transpose” task, a disembodied
control task measuring ability to inhibit spatially compatible
responses. We predicted that if there are dissociable embodied
and disembodied routes to spatial perspective-taking that are
modulated by high level strategy, then self-reported strategy
should moderate the relationship between performance on the
OBT and Transpose tasks. Specifically, we predicted a positive
relationship between performance for the OBT and Transpose
tasks that would be restricted to those who reported that they
adopted the perspective of another by transposing left and right
whenever confronted with a front-view figure; no association
was predicted for those who in an embodied manner mentally




Ninety two volunteers (69 female, 23 male), recruited primarily
from the university community, took part in the study. Their
ages ranged from 19 to 66 years (mean ±SD = 24.4 ± 9.4 years).
All had normal, or corrected to normal, vision, and provided
informed consent in accordance with the local (University of
Westminster) ethics approval.
OBT TASK
The OBT task was adapted from that reported previously
(Gardner and Potts, 2011, Experiment 1A), as summarized below.
Four basic stimuli each depicting a schematic human figure
holding a black ball in one hand and a white ball in the other,
were presented to participants. The figure could be seen either
from front- or back-view, and held the black ball in either the left
or right hand (see Figure 1, illustrating left hand stimuli). The
outline shape of the figure was identical whether it was front- or
back-facing. Consequently, the only aspects of the stimulus indi-
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of the relations between stimuli and
responses for both the OBT and Transpose tasks. For both tasks,
stimulus-response (S-R) mappings were compatible for 50% of the trials
(back-view; cue absent), and incompatible for the remainder (front-view;
cue present).
cating that the figure was front-facing were the marks indicating
the buttons and facial features.
Participants were verbally instructed to imagine taking the
perspective of the figure through an embodied mental trans-
formation in order to make a spatial judgment as to which
hand the figure was holding the black ball. Standardized instruc-
tions to this effect were also delivered via the E-prime pro-
gram. Each participant was required to rest their index fingers
on the response keys (left index finger on the “A” key for a
“left” response on a QWERTY keyboard, and right finger on the
“L” key for a “right” response). This resulted in S-R mappings
that were spatially compatible for 50% of the trials (back-view)
and spatially incompatible for the remainder (front-view; see
Figure 1).
TRANSPOSE TASK
The Transpose task (Gardner and Potts, 2011) served as a disem-
bodied control task measuring ability to inhibit spatially compat-
ible responses. The stimuli consisted of two balls, one black and
one white, in identical locations to those appearing in the OBT
task, but in this case presented without a human figure holding
them. The black ball could appear on the left or the right, and was
presented either alone, in the cue-absent condition, or accompa-
nied by an abstract visual cue, in the cue-present condition. This
abstract visual cue consisted of the features that made up the OBT
figure’s face and buttons presented in a scrambled configuration.
Thus, these stimuli served as non-embodied variants of those
employed for the OBT task (see Figure 1).
Participants were instructed to report the location of the
black ball from their own viewing perspective by pressing the
corresponding key when the abstract visual cue was absent. On
trials in which the cue was present, participants were required
to transpose left and right when responding (e.g., if the black
ball was on the right, the correct response was to press the left
response key). Thus, just as in the OBT task, the mapping between
stimulus location and response was spatially incompatible for
50% of the trials, and these trials were signaled by equivalent
visual information—those marks distinguishing front- and back-
view stimuli in the OBT task. The Transpose task should thus
place similar demands on response inhibition processes as the
OBT task for those participants adopting a transposing strategy,
given that it is operationalized in a comparable manner.
PROCEDURE
All participants performed the OBT task, followed by the Trans-
pose task. The order of these tasks was not counterbalanced in
order to prevent expected carry-over to the strategy adopted for
the OBT task if participants had experienced the Transpose task
first. On each trial, a central black fixation cross was presented
for 1400 ms against a white background. This was immediately
followed by the stimulus which was displayed for 2100ms, or until
a response had been made. This was followed by visual feedback
on whether the response was correct or incorrect, presented for
1500 ms. On any given trial, the stimulus was randomly displaced
in the picture plane (range of −50◦ to +50◦, in 10◦ intervals)
to introduce further variability in the stimulus set. Each task
comprised 132 trials split into two equal blocks, allowing all
stimulus combinations to be presented on three occasions in a
random order [left vs. right (2) x compatible vs. incompatible
(2) x picture plane orientation (11)]. Stimulus presentation and
data collection were controlled by a personal computer running
E-Prime experiment generator software (Schneider et al., 2002).
Immediately after these tasks were completed participants
were asked to report on the strategy they had used during the
OBT task, based on which they were categorized into “perspective
transformers” or “spatial transposers” in accordance with earlier
work (Gronholm et al., 2012). This was intended to discriminate
strategies on the basis of embodiment. Those who reported to
have always/usually used the “flipping left and right strategy” were
classified as (disembodied) spatial transposers, whereas those who
always/usually “imagined myself taking the figure’s position” were
classified as (embodied) perspective transformers. Participants
were classified as perspective transformers also if they reported
having used both strategies equally often.
RESULTS
Participants were excluded from the analysis due to an error
rate (ER) of above 15% on either the Transpose task (N = 5,
all female), or the OBT task (N = 14, 12 female). The sam-
ple that was subjected to analysis thus comprised 73 partici-
pants (51 female). In order to measure the relative increase in
response times for the incompatible versus compatible condition,
a “Composite response time (RT)” for both tasks was com-
puted for each participant according to the formula: Composite
RT = (incompatible RT—compatible RT)/compatible RT—see
Gronholm et al. (2012). Shapiro-Wilks test indicated these data to
be normally distributed: OBT task, W = 0.973, p = .124; Trans-
pose tasks,W = 0.989, p = .793.
REPORTED STRATEGY USE, AND PERFORMANCE ON
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING AND RESPONSE INHIBITION TASKS
According to self-report, for the OBT task 43 participants (59%)
adopted the disembodied transposing strategy and 29 (40%)
adopted the putatively embodied perspective transformation
strategy. Data on strategy use was unavailable for one further
participant. The difference between these proportions was not
statistically significant, p = .125, binomial test. By adopting
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the same classification criterion as Gronholm et al. (2012), the
embodied perspective transformation subgroup included 11
participants (38%) that reported having used both strategies.
The strategy subgroups were not found to differ in terms of
gender distribution, χ2 = 1.69, p = .194, nor age, t(69) = 0.01,
p = .992 (embodied perspective transformation: 79% female, age
(mean ±SD) = 24 ± 9.2 yrs; disembodied transposing strategy:
65% female, age = 24 ± 9.5 yrs).
Figure 2 illustrates RT and ER performance on both the OBT
and Transpose tasks categorized by the strategy reported, and the
S-R compatibility of the stimuli. RTs appeared to be longer for the
OBT task than the Transpose task, and longer for the incompatible
condition relative to the compatible condition, irrespective of the
strategy reported. These impressions were confirmed by a 3-way
mixed model Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) where Task (OBT vs.
Transpose) and Compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) were
within subject factors and Strategy (perspective transformers vs.
spatial transposers) was a between subject factor.This revealed
main effects of Compatibility, F(1,70) = 161, p < .001 and
Task, F(1,70) = 70.1, p < .001, neither of which interacted with
Strategy, Fs < 1. Furthermore, the main effect of Strategy was not
significant, F < 1. An interaction between Task and Compatibility
was found, F(1,70) = 5.48, p < .022, consistent with a higher
elevation of response times for the incompatible relative to the
compatible condition in the Transpose task (mean ± SD = 17 ±
12%) than in the OBT task (11 ± 11%). This phenomenon also
did not interact with Strategy, F(1,70) = 1.017, p = .317.
An equivalent 3-way ANOVA was also performed on the ER
data depicted in Figure 2. This revealed that ER was higher for the
OBT task (mean± SD= 7.5± 4.1%) than the Transpose task (3.1
± 2.8%), F(1,70) = 68.2, p < .001. However neither the main
effect for Compatibility, F < 1, nor that for Strategy, F < 1, were
statistically significant. Strategy was found to moderate the size
of the Task effect, F(1,70) = 4.04, p < .048. The degree to which
participants showed greater accuracy for the Transpose compared
with OBT task was slightly greater for those reporting having
adopted the disembodied spatial transposing strategy (difference
in ER, mean ± SD = 5.4 ± 4.4%, t(42) = 8.1, p < .001), than
for those reporting having adopting a perspective transformation
strategy, (3.3 ± 4.4%, t(28) = 4.0, p < .001). No other interac-
tions were statistically significant.
STRATEGY AND THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
AND RESPONSE-INHIBITION ABILITIES
We examined whether self-reported strategy moderated the rela-
tionships between perspective-taking and response inhibition
abilities by assessing correlations both within subgroups employ-
ing each type of strategy and collapsed across these subgroups,
see Figure 3. When strategy was disregarded (N = 73), a pos-
itive relationship was found between performance on the OBT
and Transpose tasks as measured by Composite RT, r = .245,
p = .036. When the correlations were repeated within sub-
groups, the relationship between perspective-taking and response
inhibition as measured by the OBT and Transpose tasks was
found to be moderated by strategy. For the subgroup that
reported having employed the disembodied spatial transpos-
ing strategy (N = 43), a highly significant positive correlation
was found, r = .449, p = .003. Whereas, for the subgroup that
FIGURE 2 | Mean of correct response times in ms and error rate (%) for both the OBT and Transpose tasks as a function of strategy reported
(perspective transformers vs. spatial transposers) and compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible).
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FIGURE 3 | Scatterplot of the association between the Composite RTs
relating to the Transpose and OBT tasks. Lines depict linear fit for
subsamples defined by strategy reported (perspect = perspective
transformers; transp = spatial transposers)
reported having employed an embodied perspective transfor-
mation strategy (N = 29), there was no correlation between
these tasks, r = −.011, p = .956. Nor were the tasks corre-
lated when the 11 participants that reported having used both
strategies were removed from the perspective transformation
subgroup, r = −.065, p = .799, N = 18. The difference in cor-
relation coefficients for perspective-transforming and transpos-
ing subgroups was statistically significant, Z = 1.96, p = .05
(Snedecor and Cochran, 1967).
DISCUSSION
The present study sought to clarify the cognitive processes
involved in spatial perspective-taking by assessing whether strat-
egy moderates the relationship between performance in tasks
designed to measure perspective-taking (OBT) and response inhi-
bition (Transpose). For the Transpose task, RTs were elevated
for the incompatible relative to compatible condition, consistent
with the costs of inhibiting a prepotent spatially compatible
response in response to a cue (Gardner and Potts, 2011). For
the OBT task, RTs were elevated for the front- relative to back-
view condition, consistent with, depending upon putative route,
either the costs of an embodied imagined transformation of per-
spective (e.g., Zacks et al., 1999; Blanke et al., 2005; Mohr et al.,
2010), or the costs of inhibiting a spatially compatible response
in response to the appearance of the front-view of the figure
(Gardner and Potts, 2011, see also May and Wendt, 2012). The
two strategy subgroups were not found to differ on overall speed
of responding, or size of compatibility effect, in either the OBT
or Transpose tasks. However, as predicted, participants’ self-
report of which of these two strategies they had employed for
the OBT task was found to moderate the relationship between
the degree of elevation in response times resulting from incom-
patibility in the OBT and Transpose tasks. Specifically, response
inhibition ability, indexed by the Transpose task, was found to
be related to perspective-taking ability—but selectively for those
reporting that they had adopted the disembodied spatial trans-
posing strategy. This relationship was absent in those report-
ing having adopted an embodied perspective transformation
strategy.
The selective association found between performance on the
Transpose and OBT tasks implies that response inhibition ability
predicts perspective-taking ability only among those that choose
to take on another’s perspective using a “spatial transposing”
strategy—that is, by reconfiguring spatial relationships as they
appear from one’s own perspective. This association complements
earlier work (Qureshi, 2008), by showing that the association
between response inhibition and perspective-taking also general-
izes to the perspective-taking performance measured by the OBT
task, more specifically the relative ability to adopt a perspective
differing from one’s own by 180◦ compared to 0◦. The selective
association is particularly important in providing evidence that
this disembodied spatial transposing strategy is dissociable from
an embodied perspective transformation strategy. Previously, the
existence of this route was only implied by the absence of an asso-
ciation between trait empathy and perspective-taking ability oth-
erwise present for those reporting having performed perspective
transformations (Gronholm et al., 2012). Furthermore, the trans-
posing subgroup also showed greater improvement in accuracy
between the OBT and Transpose tasks. This could be explained
in terms of their strategy for perspective-taking rendering the
OBT task computationally equivalent to the Transpose task which
leads to greater carry over from practice in comparison to the
perspective transformation subgroup.These dissociations provide
support for an independent disembodied route, consistent with
findings for sensorimotor interference within the spatial updating
literature for imaginal perspective changes in remembered envi-
ronments (May, 2004).
Combined with earlier results (Gronholm et al., 2012), the
present findings complete a double dissociation, implying
that the spatial transposing and perspective transformation
strategies reflect two separable routes to spatial perspective-
taking. Where previously we described these strategies as
empathic and non-empathic (Gronholm et al., 2012), we now
suggest that this dissociation might be better characterized as
between “embodied” perspective transformations and “disem-
bodied” routes (Kessler and Rutherford, 2010; Stocker, 2012;
Becchio et al., 2013; Tomasino and Rumiati, 2013). The embod-
ied route, probably mediated by mental simulation of self
motion (Lenggenhager et al., 2008; Steggemann et al., 2011),
appears linked to social determinants such as trait empathy
(Gronholm et al., 2012). The disembodied route, which the
present results suggest involves the deliberate reconfiguration of
spatial relationships as they appear from one’s own point of view,
may be completely insensitive to social context or whether the
new perspective is a position occupied by a person. This dis-
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sociation builds upon evidence suggesting dissociable processes
for level 1 and level 2 perspective-taking (Michelon and Zacks,
2006; Kessler and Thomson, 2010), by implying that further
fractionation is possible purely within the level 2 perspective-
taking involved in the OBT task, confirming the hitherto
untested hypotheses of other authors (e.g., Thakkar et al., 2009;
Mohr et al., 2010; Thakkar and Park, 2010).
These results also inform debate on the suitability of the
OBT and related tasks to measure spatial perspective-taking
(Gardner and Potts, 2011; May and Wendt, 2012, under review).
Given the way that it is operationalized with only four types of
stimuli, the OBT task may be particularly susceptible to low-
level alternative strategies. However, there are at least three rea-
sons not simply to dismiss the OBT task as a test of spatial
perspective-taking on the basis that it may be solved by the
reconfiguration of spatial relationships as they appear from one’s
own position. First, this issue does not appear to be unique to
the OBT task. A similar mechanism could contribute to per-
formance in other tasks employing laterality judgments (e.g.,
Michelon and Zacks, 2006; Kessler and Thomson, 2010, see May
and Wendt, under review), although it is less likely to extend
to tasks requiring participants to imagine the appearance of
an array from a novel perspective (e.g., Langdon and Coltheart,
2001). Second, evidence that imitation also imposes a demand to
inhibit incompatible S-R mappings (e.g., Ishikura and Inomata,
1995; Heyes and Ray, 2004; Jackson et al., 2006; Chiavarino et al.,
2007), suggests that spatial transposing may be pervasive in
face-to-face social interactions. Third, the present results imply
that although the low-level reconfiguration of spatial relation-
ships may contribute to performance in the OBT task, this may
be restricted to a subset of participants adopting a particular
“spatial transposing” strategy. Thus, this finding implies that
identifying the interpersonal determinants of strategy selection
may be a worthwhile avenue for research in spatial perspective-
taking, and social interaction more generally (see Mohr et al.,
2013).
The finding that the two dissociable perspective-taking pro-
cesses may be reliably categorized by self-reported strategy also
implies that the route to perspective-taking may be endogenously
triggered. This evidence contrasts with other research showing
exogenous triggering of embodied perspective-taking, either by
revealing enhanced perspective-taking for body present com-
pared with body absent conditions (Becchio et al., 2013), or by
showing that congruence between the postures of the participant
and an avatar facilitated performance (Kessler and Thomson,
2010). However, our finding that the presentation of a figure
is not sufficient to elicit embodied perspective-taking corre-
sponds to the finding that galvanic vestibular stimulation selec-
tively disrupts mental task performance for participants adopting
an egocentric rather than object-based transformation strategy
(Lenggenhager et al., 2008). It also complements work demon-
strating that the presence of a body was neither a necessary con-
dition for response latency being related to the extent of imag-
ined self rotation (Michelon and Zacks, 2006), nor for congru-
ence effects between the participant’s body position and direction
of imagined rotation (Kessler and Thomson, 2010). Although
research to date implies that embodied perspective-taking can be
both endogeneously and exogenously driven, the significance of
the present results is that they demonstrate endogenous driven
embodied perspective-taking for a task that, by inviting partici-
pants to step into the shoes of the schematic figure, might have
been assumed likely to have triggered an embodied route exoge-
nously. This corresponds with the view that the strategic modu-
lation of embodied and disembodied routes is pervasive in vari-
ous domains of cognition, including object based mental rotation,
and language learning (Tomasino and Rumiati, 2013).
The absence of a correlation for the perspective transformation
subgroup between perspective-taking and response inhibition,
and the statistically significant difference in correlation coefficient
compared to the spatial transformation subgroup, implies this
executive function is not involved in the “embodied” route to
perspective-taking to the same extent as for the “disembodied”
route adopted by spatial transposers. This is consistent with
earlier findings implying the fractionation of perspective-taking
processes into cognitively efficient and cognitively demanding
components (Michelon and Zacks, 2006; Samson et al., 2010;
Qureshi et al., 2010), and with the different developmental
trajectories of perspective-taking and executive function
(Dumontheil et al., 2010). Previously, the cognitively demanding
perspective-taking process was taken to be either the calculation
of spatial relationships relative to an alternative viewpoint
(Michelon and Zacks, 2006—“level 2” knowledge; Flavell et al.,
1981)or the selection of either the self or other perspective
(Qureshi et al., 2010). Whereas, the cognitively efficient process
in both studies was the calculation about what is visible from
another viewpoint (level 1 knowledge). By contrast, in the present
study, both routes involve the calculation of spatial relationships,
but only the disembodied route appears to load onto response
inhibition. This raises the possibility that a dedicated, domain
specific, route also exists for level 2 perspective-taking, provided
that one uses an embodied strategy (cf Amorim et al., 2006). We
speculate that this route may place relatively light demands on
domain general resources, although further research is required
to assess this possibility.
Limitations of the correlational method adopted in the present
study should be acknowledged. On one hand, our choice of the
Transpose task as a measure of response inhibition could have
elevated correlations in both subgroups due to shared variance
attributable to procedural similarity between the OBT and Trans-
pose tasks. On the other hand, methodological limitations could
contribute to the absence of a statistically significant correlation
for the embodied perspective transformation subgroup; the per-
spective transformation subgroup was smaller, and potentially
more heterogeneous than the spatial transformation subgroup.
Although the magnitude of the correlation coefficients reported
here between perspective-taking and response inhibition should
therefore be interpreted with caution, critically these correla-
tions were found to differ significantly between subgroups. Dif-
ferences in sample size would have reduced the power of this
test, and shared variance attributable to task similarity would
be expected to affect both subgroups equally. Nonetheless, our
findings should ideally be corroborated using an experimental
approach such as the dual taskmethodology used byQureshi et al.
(2010), despite contrasting selective associations being an
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established methodology for revealing evidence for dissociable
processes (e.g., Asendorpf et al., 2002).
Finally, it should be noted that participants’ performance for
the OBT and Transpose tasks did not show the close equivalence
found in other research using the same tasks (Gardner and Potts,
2011). In the present study, overall performance was found to
be better for the Transpose than the OBT task, both in terms of
shorter RTs and fewer errors, and the size of the compatibility
effect was greater in the Transpose task than in the OBT task.
At first glance, these findings might be taken to imply that the
Transpose task is not a good control for the OBT task, or, alter-
natively, that the disembodied spatial transposing route is more
efficient than the embodied perspective transformation route.
However, in the current experiment, all participants completed
the Transpose task after the OBT task in order not to influence the
strategy employed for the OBT task—a likely possibility had order
been counterbalanced. Therefore, the between task differences in
performance could be accounted for by practice in the first task
(OBT) leading to better performance in a similar second task
(Transpose), particularly for the compatible trials, and particu-
larly for those adopting a disembodied spatial transposing strat-
egy. Such differences were not found when different participants
completed the two tasks (Gardner and Potts, 2011).
In conclusion, our main finding was a selective association
whereby response inhibition was related to perspective-taking
ability only among participants adopting a “spatial transpos-
ing” strategy—that is, by reconfiguring spatial relationships as
they appear from one’s own perspective. Combined with earlier
results (Gronholm et al., 2012), this evidence completes a dou-
ble dissociation between two independent routes to perspective-
taking in the OBT task. We propose that these routes either
recruit “embodied” egocentric mental transformation processes,
or involve the “disembodied” reconfiguration of spatial relation-
ships. The contributions made by these findings are that they
elucidate the processes involved in perspective-taking, imply that
perspective-taking route is under higher order control, and lend
support to the hypothesis that embodied routes to perspective-
taking place minimal demands on domain general executive
functions.
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